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Reserve System. I thank my colleagues at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis—especially
Mike Dueker—for their assistance and comments,
but I retain full responsibility for errors.
Investment spending grew considerably faster
than GDP in the late 1990s. The computer equip-
ment and software category of business invest-
ment, in particular, grew at an astounding rate
of 19 percent per year from 1995 to 2000, as
compared with an 11 percent growth rate from
1989—the last full year before the 1990-91 reces-
sion—to 1995. After the investment boom of the
late 1990s, business fixed investment declined
for eight straight quarters until the fourth quarter
of 2002.
To get a handle on why business investment
boomed and waned, it is useful to refer to a frame-
work that places importance on deciding when
to invest as well as whether to invest. As a long-
term proposition, firms will have to make critical
investments in technology in order to remain
competitive. From a business-cycle perspective,
an especially interesting question concerns the
timing of that investment.
When analyzing timing, it is important to rec-
ognize that most projects are not fully reversible
once they are undertaken. Nevertheless, because
most investment projects can be delayed, currently
available investment opportunities must be
weighed against future opportunities. Purchasers
of personal computers, for instance, are well aware
of the need to consider what additional capabili-
ties they could obtain in a PC a year from now if
the purchase were postponed.
The rate-of-return hurdle that a risky, but post-
ponable, project must clear in order to justify
I
’m delighted to be here today to speak at
this hometown Missouri Valley Economics
Association conference. It’s always fun for
me to put on my academic hat again. Today
my chosen topic is investment, which is one of
the most volatile forms of spending. Business
investment has certainly lived up to its reputation
over this business cycle. As we try to understand
the likely course of the economy in coming quar-
ters, the probable behavior of investment, and
the risks of alternative outcomes, is “topic one.”
In fact, business investment has been topic
one continuously over the last couple of years.
During and after every recession, analysts focus
on the type of spending, whether consumption,
investment, or government, that is expected to
drive the economic recovery. In most cases, invest-
ment is front and center because that is the most
volatile component of GDP. Typically, economists
watch both housing investment and business
investment, because typically both have declined
substantially during the recession. This time,
housing investment remained on a remarkably
high plateau, which makes business investment
central to forecasting the pace of expansion.
I do not want to leave the impression that
business investment is the only GDP component
subject to uncertainty going forward. But I will
concentrate on business investment because that
is where I see the greatest uncertainties at this
time. I’ll start by looking back at the way invest-
ment boomed in the late 1990s before it declined
in 2000 and 2001.
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that
the views I express here are mine and do not
necessarily reflect official positions of the Federalinvestment without delay rises with the following
three factors:
1. the risk-free real rate of return;
2. a risk premium to compensate for uncer-
tainty regarding the returns on the invest-
ment; and
3. an indicator of whether the cost of financ-
ing is high now relative to what it might be
in the future. If financing appears relatively
expensive today, then projects may be
postponed.
What data give approximate figures for these
three factors? And, what do these data tell us about
market incentives and signals regarding invest-
ment during the boom and bust? The risk-free
real rate of return is well proxied by the yield on
inflation-indexed Treasury bonds. The yield on
the 10-year indexed bond peaked at 4.37 percent
in January 2000. Today the comparable yield is
less than 2 percent. If we measure market risk
premiums as the spreads between yields on cor-
porate bonds of different investment grades, risk
premiums were unusually low between 1996 and
the financial market upset in the fall of 1998 that
followed the Russian default and Long Term
Capital Management’s near insolvency. Chairman
Greenspan testified in February 1997 that “risk
premiums for advancing funds to businesses in
nearly all financial markets have declined to near-
record low” (Federal Reserve Board Summary
Report, Monetary Policy Objectives: 1997
(February 26, 1997), p. 8). Between late 1998 and
late 2000, corporate bond spreads held steady at
relatively low levels. Then, in the fourth quarter
of 2000, corporate bond spreads (AAA to BBB)
increased by about a half a percentage point and
have remained there.
As an indicator of the attractiveness of current
financing terms, we can use the yield on mortgage-
backed securities relative to the yield on Treasury
bonds, with both yields adjusted for expected
inflation. The key difference between Treasury
bonds and mortgage-backed securities is that the
underlying mortgages, and therefore the mortgage-
backed securities, can be repaid at par at any
time at the discretion of the mortgage borrower,
whereas Treasury bonds cannot. If the market
foresees a lower mortgage rate in the future, then
the current Treasury bond yield will be corre-
spondingly low relative to the current yield on
mortgage-backed securities. With this signal of
likely cheaper financing in the future, the incen-
tive is for businesses to delay investment.
What do these numbers look like today? The
incentive to delay has actually increased since
January 2000. The ratio of the expected real return
on GNMA mortgage-backed securities to the
expected real return on 10-year Treasury bonds
has risen. This ratio went from 1.31 in January
2000 to 1.57 in January 2003, as the GNMA and
Treasury yields went from 7.97 percent and 6.66
percent, respectively, in January 2000 to 5.24 and
4.05 percent, respectively, in January 2003. The
drop in expected real returns on benchmark cor-
porate bonds since January 2000, however, has
more than offset this increase in the incentive to
delay investment, so the required rate of return
on new investment has declined on net since
January 2000.
Given positive conditions between 1997 and
2000—in the form of both low risk premiums and
favorable financing terms—it makes sense that
business investment spending was in high gear
during most of that period. It also makes sense
that as business investment peaked in 2000, the
demand for funds and the real risk-free rate also
peaked.
Because the boom in computer and software
investment was particularly strong in the late
1990s, it is worth considering special factors
behind this type of investment—above and beyond
the market conditions that fueled investment in
general. I will not resort exclusively to the claim
that the boom in computers and software was due
to excessively optimistic revenue projections.
Computer investment was also strong because
the usual incentives to wait to invest were tem-
porarily muted by unique circumstances in the
late 1990s. First, the initial public offering of
Netscape stock in 1995 heralded the widespread
adoption of the Internet. Suddenly, computer
users had to worry about whether their hardware
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2and software were compatible with emerging
Internet standards and authentication protocols—
not just whether their computers would continue
to run stand-alone software fast enough. These
new uses and standards clearly helped destroy
part of the value of waiting to replace computers
and software.
The looming issue of Y2K compliance also
spurred a surge in computer replacement and
software upgrades. The usual calculus of spending
for additional features versus sticking with current
equipment became one where the current set-up
might not run at all after January 1, 2000. The fact
that the consequences of any Y2K noncompliance
were hard to quantify probably only hastened
preventive investment. Of course, once we entered
the year 2000, the usual incentives to wait to
invest in new computers quickly returned to
normal. Moore’s Law—that processor speeds
double every 18 months—resumed its usual role
in tempering the incentive to buy now. The after-
math of Y2K caused an especially large retrench-
ment in computer investment, however, given that
the average age of the installed computer base
was unusually low.
In addition, the so-called “first-mover advan-
tage” was probably overstated during the dot-com
era. The idea was that online sales in many lines
of business would turn out to be natural near-
monopolies. Based on belief in first-mover advan-
tage, dot-com and telecommunications companies
raced at breakneck pace to grow very quickly, in
anticipation of establishing a large market share.
It turned out, however, that too many entrants
grew faster than their potential market. This phe-
nomenon was most evident in the telecommuni-
cations sector, where fiber optic traffic even today
is far below the installed capacity. To make matters
worse, telecommunications firms underestimated
technical progress in sending large amounts of
data over each physical fiber. They also overesti-
mated the willingness of customers to pay to
connect their desktops to the fiber—the last-mile
problem. It is striking to note that industrial capac-
ity in high-tech goods more than quintupled
between 1995 and 2000. For manufacturing out-
side of high-tech, industrial capacity increased
by only 12 percent.
In this unusual environment, it is not surpris-
ing that the market had trouble distinguishing
how much of the preceding flurry of investment
and sales growth was permanent and how much
was temporary. The result was some misalloca-
tion of capital, given what we know today, that
yielded little return and hurt profit growth for
the economy as a whole. Moreover, because of
the importance of retained earnings in financing
investment spending, the profit slump has pro-
longed the investment slump. In some sectors,
the profit slump has been more like a prolonged
drought. The communications sector has seen 11
straight quarters of losses to the present. The auto-
motive sector has had 10 consecutive quarters of
losses. The electronics and electrical equipment
sector, in contrast, turned the corner by ending
five straight quarters of losses in mid-2002.
After this bleak rundown, waiting for the
upturn in investment might seem like waiting
for Godot. Indeed, the outlook for corporate profit
growth now looks a bit less promising than it did
three months ago, although double-digit profit
growth is still projected for 2003. Forecasters have
correspondingly reduced their projections of
growth in investment spending slightly, although
an uptick in spending on computer equipment
and software is expected in the second half of
2003. One reason for computer investment to
rebound in 2003 is that computers depreciate
faster than other forms of capital. Any overhang
in computer investment from Y2K and the dot-
com era ought to be working its way out of the
system at this time.
Much of the renewed demand for computer
and software investment is expected to come
from finance and service firms. This expectation
is consistent with the view that the U.S. manufac-
turing sector is experiencing not only the effects
of a recession but also a continuation of the shift
toward a service economy. To the extent that
some of the decline in manufacturing is secular,
investment by manufacturers will not necessarily
bounce back to previous levels. Further evidence
of the weakness in manufacturing is the high
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record double-digit levels. Housing investment
is not expected to have a sharp rebound either,
largely because it did not weaken appreciably
during the 2001 recession. Housing was buoyed
by attractive mortgage rates and the fact that, since
2000, it offered one of the few sources of capital
gains.
Right now everyone hears numerous refer-
ences to geopolitical risk and its effect on the
economy. One positive element, however, is that
investment spending will receive a boost from
accelerated first-year depreciation allowances
for new plants and equipment. The Job Creation
and Worker Assistance Act of 2002 allows firms
to claim a first-year depreciation allowance of 44
percent instead of the usual 20 percent. This
depreciation bonus is available for new invest-
ment between September 2001 and September
2004. Firms have known about it since March
2002, but its full effect might not be felt until this
year—or even early next year—when the bonus
can interact with a more vibrant economy.
Another positive in the picture is that over
coming quarters firms likely will begin to act on
declines in the cost of capital. Combining the risk-
free rate, a risk premium and the incentive to wait
to invest, the cost of capital is now back down to
the levels last seen in early 1998 and early 1999—
at least when using an investment-grade corporate
bond yield to measure the benchmark return. If
instead we use the expected return on equities
as a benchmark return, the cost of capital today
is considerably lower today than in the late 1990s.
The bottom line seems to be that fundamentals
supporting increasing investment are in place.
However, geopolitical uncertainties leave us
with evidence, from the relationship of Treasury
yields to mortgage-backed securities yields, that
firms currently do have some incentive to delay
investment relative to conditions several years
ago. These incentives could change quickly;
lessening of geopolitical concerns would change
expectations and change the incentive to delay
investment.
A natural question is whether monetary policy
can encourage investment spending in the cur-
rent environment. In terms of risk premiums and
incentives to postpone investment in the frame-
work I laid out earlier, monetary policy can
contribute positively by avoiding inflation sur-
prises—both inflationary and deflationary—
which will help ensure that market risk premiums
are not elevated by an unnecessary inflation risk
premium. If the Fed does its part, firms and indi-
viduals will receive clearer signals of the expected
rate of return required of each type of prospective
investment project, which will help the market
weed out the bad from the good. The Fed, obvi-
ously, has no direct role in resolving the geopoliti-
cal uncertainties but does have a role, which I
think it is fulfilling, in maintaining a sound long-
run financial environment. I am very bullish on
the long-term capacity of the American economy
to generate plenty of good investment opportuni-
ties through innovation and productivity growth.
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